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Author SHA1 Message Date
Marcus Wirtz 7fb5e29699
Merge b23eb344e8 into 12cd2235ef 2026-07-16 08:26:09 -04:00
Aiqiao Yan 12cd2235ef
trim only ascii whitespace for branch (#2521)
* trim only ascii whitespace for branch

* rebuild
2026-07-15 15:05:42 -04:00
Aiqiao Yan 62661c4e71
skip running unsafe pr check if input is default (#2518) 2026-07-15 10:02:03 -04:00
Marcus Wirtz b23eb344e8
Fix stuff 2026-04-21 12:30:04 +02:00
Marcus Wirtz a0eb51f8ea
fix: fix adding safe-directory in container 2026-04-21 11:32:17 +02:00
7 changed files with 202 additions and 49 deletions

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@ -314,7 +314,6 @@ jobs:
fi
# Verify auth token
git config --global --add safe.directory "*"
git fetch --no-tags --depth=1 origin +refs/heads/main:refs/remotes/origin/main
# needed to make checkout post cleanup succeed

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@ -24,9 +24,20 @@ const mockGithubContext: any = {
payload: {}
}
// Replicate @actions/core getInput behavior: it trims whitespace by default
// (String.prototype.trim(), which strips characters such as a leading U+FEFF BOM)
// unless trimWhitespace is explicitly set to false.
const getInputImpl = (name: string, options?: {trimWhitespace?: boolean}) => {
const val = inputs[name] ?? ''
if (options && options.trimWhitespace === false) {
return val
}
return typeof val === 'string' ? val.trim() : val
}
// Mock @actions/core before loading input-helper
jest.unstable_mockModule('@actions/core', () => ({
getInput: jest.fn((name: string) => inputs[name]),
getInput: jest.fn(getInputImpl),
getBooleanInput: jest.fn((name: string) => inputs[name]),
getMultilineInput: jest.fn((name: string) =>
inputs[name] ? String(inputs[name]).split('\n').filter(Boolean) : []
@ -76,9 +87,7 @@ describe('input-helper tests', () => {
inputs = {}
jest.clearAllMocks()
// Re-apply default mocks
;(core.getInput as jest.Mock<any>).mockImplementation(
(name: string) => inputs[name]
)
;(core.getInput as jest.Mock<any>).mockImplementation(getInputImpl as any)
mockDirectoryExistsSync.mockImplementation(
(p: string) => p === gitHubWorkspace
)
@ -176,8 +185,84 @@ describe('input-helper tests', () => {
expect(settings.commit).toBeFalsy()
})
it('does not reclassify a ref as sha when a BOM is prefixed', async () => {
// A fork branch named "<U+FEFF>" + 40 hex chars. core.getInput trims the
// BOM by default, which previously collapsed this into a bare SHA and
// bypassed the unsafe fork PR checkout guard.
inputs.ref = '\uFEFF522d932fae5296da51fdf431934425ecf891c6a2'
const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
expect(settings.commit).toBeFalsy()
expect(settings.ref).toBe('522d932fae5296da51fdf431934425ecf891c6a2')
})
it('does not reclassify a sha-256 ref as sha when a BOM is prefixed', async () => {
inputs.ref =
'\uFEFF1111111111222222222233333333334444444444555555555566666666667777'
const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
expect(settings.commit).toBeFalsy()
expect(settings.ref).toBe(
'1111111111222222222233333333334444444444555555555566666666667777'
)
})
it('treats a sha surrounded by ascii whitespace as a commit', async () => {
// ASCII whitespace can only come from the workflow author's YAML (git ref
// names cannot contain it), so trimming it and treating the value as a
// commit is safe.
inputs.ref = ' 1111111111222222222233333333334444444444 '
const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
expect(settings.ref).toBeFalsy()
expect(settings.commit).toBe('1111111111222222222233333333334444444444')
})
it('sets workflow organization ID', async () => {
const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
expect(settings.workflowOrganizationId).toBe(123456)
})
describe('unsafe PR checkout guard', () => {
const forkPayload = {
repository: {id: 100},
pull_request: {
head: {
sha: '1234567890123456789012345678901234567890',
repo: {id: 200, full_name: 'attacker/fork'}
},
merge_commit_sha: 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa'
}
}
it('allows the default self-checkout on a fork pull_request_target', async () => {
const originalEvent = mockGithubContext.eventName
const originalPayload = mockGithubContext.payload
try {
mockGithubContext.eventName = 'pull_request_target'
mockGithubContext.payload = forkPayload
// Simulate a rebase/fast-forward merge where the base tip (event SHA)
// equals the PR head SHA. The default self-checkout must still succeed.
mockGithubContext.sha = '1234567890123456789012345678901234567890'
const settings: IGitSourceSettings = await inputHelper.getInputs()
expect(settings.commit).toBe('1234567890123456789012345678901234567890')
} finally {
mockGithubContext.eventName = originalEvent
mockGithubContext.payload = originalPayload
}
})
it('refuses an explicit fork repository on pull_request_target', async () => {
const originalEvent = mockGithubContext.eventName
const originalPayload = mockGithubContext.payload
try {
mockGithubContext.eventName = 'pull_request_target'
mockGithubContext.payload = forkPayload
inputs.repository = 'attacker/fork'
await expect(inputHelper.getInputs()).rejects.toThrow(
/Refusing to check out fork pull request code/
)
} finally {
mockGithubContext.eventName = originalEvent
mockGithubContext.payload = originalPayload
}
})
})
})

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@ -15,9 +15,6 @@ fi
cd "$CHECKOUT_PATH"
# Add safe directory for container environments
git config --global --add safe.directory "*" 2>/dev/null || true
# Show the includeIf configuration
echo "Git config includeIf entries:"
git config --list --show-origin | grep -i include || true

39
dist/index.js vendored
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@ -42100,6 +42100,22 @@ async function getInputs() {
`${github_context.repo.owner}/${github_context.repo.repo}`.toUpperCase();
// Source branch, source version
result.ref = getInput('ref');
// core.getInput()'s default trim strips a range of Unicode characters such as a
// leading BOM (U+FEFF) or NBSP (U+00A0). Those are valid in a git ref name, so
// a fork branch named "<BOM>" + 40 hex chars would trim down to a bare SHA and
// be silently reclassified as a commit, bypassing the unsafe fork PR checkout
// guard.
//
// The trim below strips only the ASCII whitespace characters which are all forbidden
// in a git branch name.
// \t U+0009 horizontal tab - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \n U+000A line feed - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \v U+000B vertical tab - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \f U+000C form feed - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \r U+000D carriage return - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// ' ' U+0020 space - forbidden in ref names
const asciiTrimmedRef = getInput('ref', { trimWhitespace: false })
.replace(/^[\t\n\v\f\r ]+|[\t\n\v\f\r ]+$/g, '');
if (!result.ref) {
if (isWorkflowRepository) {
result.ref = github_context.ref;
@ -42112,8 +42128,8 @@ async function getInputs() {
}
}
// SHA?
else if (result.ref.match(/^(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{40}|[0-9a-fA-F]{64})$/)) {
result.commit = result.ref;
else if (asciiTrimmedRef.match(/^(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{40}|[0-9a-fA-F]{64})$/)) {
result.commit = asciiTrimmedRef;
result.ref = '';
}
core_debug(`ref = '${result.ref}'`);
@ -42191,12 +42207,19 @@ async function getInputs() {
(getInput('allow-unsafe-pr-checkout') || 'false').toUpperCase() ===
'TRUE';
core_debug(`allow unsafe PR checkout = ${result.allowUnsafePrCheckout}`);
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository,
ref: result.ref,
commit: result.commit,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
});
// The default self-checkout (this repository with no explicit ref) always
// resolves to the trusted ref/commit GitHub set for the triggering event, so
// the fork-checkout guard only needs to run when the caller customized the
// repository or ref.
const isDefaultCheckout = isWorkflowRepository && !getInput('ref');
if (!isDefaultCheckout) {
assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository,
ref: result.ref,
commit: result.commit,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
});
}
return result;
}

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@ -44,20 +44,14 @@ export async function getSource(settings: IGitSourceSettings): Promise<void> {
if (git) {
authHelper = gitAuthHelper.createAuthHelper(git, settings)
if (settings.setSafeDirectory) {
// Setup the repository path as a safe directory, so if we pass this into a container job with a different user it doesn't fail
// Otherwise all git commands we run in a container fail
await authHelper.configureTempGlobalConfig()
core.info(
`Adding repository directory to the temporary git global config as a safe directory`
await addSafeDirectory(settings.repositoryPath, git, authHelper)
const containerPath = getContainerRepositoryPath(
settings.repositoryPath,
settings.githubWorkspacePath
)
await git
.config('safe.directory', settings.repositoryPath, true, true)
.catch(error => {
core.info(
`Failed to initialize safe directory with error: ${error}`
)
})
if (containerPath && containerPath !== settings.repositoryPath) {
await addSafeDirectory(containerPath, git, authHelper)
}
stateHelper.setSafeDirectory()
}
@ -350,18 +344,7 @@ export async function cleanup(repositoryPath: string): Promise<void> {
const authHelper = gitAuthHelper.createAuthHelper(git)
try {
if (stateHelper.PostSetSafeDirectory) {
// Setup the repository path as a safe directory, so if we pass this into a container job with a different user it doesn't fail
// Otherwise all git commands we run in a container fail
await authHelper.configureTempGlobalConfig()
core.info(
`Adding repository directory to the temporary git global config as a safe directory`
)
await git
.config('safe.directory', repositoryPath, true, true)
.catch(error => {
core.info(`Failed to initialize safe directory with error: ${error}`)
})
await addSafeDirectory(repositoryPath, git, authHelper)
}
await authHelper.removeAuth()
@ -390,3 +373,39 @@ async function getGitCommandManager(
return undefined
}
}
async function addSafeDirectory(
safeDirectory: string,
git: IGitCommandManager,
authHelper: gitAuthHelper.IGitAuthHelper
): Promise<void> {
await authHelper.configureTempGlobalConfig()
core.info(`Adding '${safeDirectory}' to the git global config as a safe directory`)
await git.config('safe.directory', safeDirectory, true, true).catch(error => {
core.info(`Failed to initialize safe directory with error: ${error}`)
})
}
function getContainerRepositoryPath(
repositoryPath: string,
githubWorkspace?: string
): string {
if (!githubWorkspace) {
return ''
}
let relativeRepositoryPath = path.relative(githubWorkspace, repositoryPath)
if (!relativeRepositoryPath || relativeRepositoryPath === '.') {
return '/github/workspace'
}
if (
relativeRepositoryPath.startsWith('..') ||
path.isAbsolute(relativeRepositoryPath)
) {
return ''
}
relativeRepositoryPath = relativeRepositoryPath.replace(/\\/g, '/')
return path.posix.join('/github/workspace', relativeRepositoryPath)
}

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@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
export interface IGitSourceSettings {
/**
* The workflow workspace path
*/
githubWorkspacePath?: string
/**
* The location on disk where the repository will be placed
*/

View File

@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
throw new Error('GITHUB_WORKSPACE not defined')
}
githubWorkspacePath = path.resolve(githubWorkspacePath)
result.githubWorkspacePath = githubWorkspacePath
core.debug(`GITHUB_WORKSPACE = '${githubWorkspacePath}'`)
fsHelper.directoryExistsSync(githubWorkspacePath, true)
@ -59,6 +60,23 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
// Source branch, source version
result.ref = core.getInput('ref')
// core.getInput()'s default trim strips a range of Unicode characters such as a
// leading BOM (U+FEFF) or NBSP (U+00A0). Those are valid in a git ref name, so
// a fork branch named "<BOM>" + 40 hex chars would trim down to a bare SHA and
// be silently reclassified as a commit, bypassing the unsafe fork PR checkout
// guard.
//
// The trim below strips only the ASCII whitespace characters which are all forbidden
// in a git branch name.
// \t U+0009 horizontal tab - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \n U+000A line feed - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \v U+000B vertical tab - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \f U+000C form feed - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// \r U+000D carriage return - ASCII control, forbidden in ref names
// ' ' U+0020 space - forbidden in ref names
const asciiTrimmedRef = core
.getInput('ref', {trimWhitespace: false})
.replace(/^[\t\n\v\f\r ]+|[\t\n\v\f\r ]+$/g, '')
if (!result.ref) {
if (isWorkflowRepository) {
result.ref = github.context.ref
@ -72,8 +90,8 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
}
}
// SHA?
else if (result.ref.match(/^(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{40}|[0-9a-fA-F]{64})$/)) {
result.commit = result.ref
else if (asciiTrimmedRef.match(/^(?:[0-9a-fA-F]{40}|[0-9a-fA-F]{64})$/)) {
result.commit = asciiTrimmedRef
result.ref = ''
}
core.debug(`ref = '${result.ref}'`)
@ -168,12 +186,19 @@ export async function getInputs(): Promise<IGitSourceSettings> {
'TRUE'
core.debug(`allow unsafe PR checkout = ${result.allowUnsafePrCheckout}`)
unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository,
ref: result.ref,
commit: result.commit,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
})
// The default self-checkout (this repository with no explicit ref) always
// resolves to the trusted ref/commit GitHub set for the triggering event, so
// the fork-checkout guard only needs to run when the caller customized the
// repository or ref.
const isDefaultCheckout = isWorkflowRepository && !core.getInput('ref')
if (!isDefaultCheckout) {
unsafePrCheckoutHelper.assertSafePrCheckout({
qualifiedRepository,
ref: result.ref,
commit: result.commit,
allowUnsafePrCheckout: result.allowUnsafePrCheckout
})
}
return result
}